USAID's central failure was the way it spent money: too many programs aimed at marginal rather than
transformational improvements, in too many countries. Each country office spread its money too thin. Despite a
veneer of strategic planning, country missions had too many programs in too many sectors. Each program had too
many components. This meant that even successful programs (and USAID's own evaluations show many were not)
could not play a significant role in moving countries along the path from poverty to prosperity. These
programs failed in their ambition, their design, their costly method of implementation and therefore their
impact. Any chance at transformational change was whittled away by this diffusion of focus in general, and on
the number of programs chasing small impacts in particular.
What was lost was the opportunity to work on big things with the possibility of game changing impact. Despite
good intentions, the reality was too few programs that partnered with nations on ambitious initiatives in our
mutual interest.
The new foreign assistance should focus. It should focus geographically. It should focus on problems where
there is a meaningful opportunity for major impact, on targeted interventions, on working with the private
sector. It should focus on program impact, not paperwork process. It should treat governments as partners with
the responsibility to solve their own development challenges with support from the United States. The new
foreign assistance should not have the United States substitute for the local government and private sector.